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Warning: California Antismoking Laws
May Be Dangerous to Your
Health-An Analysis of
Nonsmokers' Rights in the
Workplace
The right of an individual to risk his or her own health does not include
the right to jeopardize the health of those who must remain around him
or her in order to properly pe form the duties of their jobs.1
The ill effects of cigarette smoking on the smoker have been recog-
nized for many years.' Recent studies have indicated, however, that
tobacco smoke has deleterious effects on the nonsmoker as well.3 To-
bacco smoke contains a variety of vapors,4 gases,5 and particulates.6
Many of these substances are hazardous.' Some are even carcino-
genic.' Cigarette smoke has been considered to be the most lethal of all
breathable pollutants.9
Persons who are allergic to cigarette smoke have been characterized
as hypersensitive.1" Hypersensitive persons may suffer from a variety
of physiological maladies when they are exposed to cigarette smoke.11
Cigarette smoke has been found to aggravate conditions of chronic
I. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408, 415 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
2. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL: 1972, at 121 [hereinafter cited as 1972
REPORT].
3. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, CLEAN YOUR RoOM! A COMPENDIUM ON IN-
DOOR POLLrTION, III.E.8-9 (1982).
4. Vapors are "visible emanation[s] of fine particles of a liquid." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1533 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as STEDMAN'S].
5. Gases are "thin fluid[s], like air, capable ofindefinite expansion, but convertible by com-
pression and cold into a liquid and, eventually, solid." Id at 575.
6. Particulates are "[flormed elements, discrete bodies, as contrasted with the surrounding
liquid or semiliquid material, e.g., granules or mitochondria in cells." Id at 1038.
7. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at III.E.5-6.
8. Id
9. Comment, The Nonsmoker in Public: 4 Review andAnalysis of Nonsmokers Rights, 7 SAN
FERN. V.L. Rav. 141, 145 (1979) (citing Zussman, List of Illnesses and Disabilities Associated with
Smoking, 2 MED. J. OF AUSTL. 4 (1975)).
10. See Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 87 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
11. 368 A.2d at 410; Comment, Where There's Smoke There's Ire: The SearchforLegalPaths
to Tobacco-Free Air, 3 COLUM. J. OF EIWrL. L. 62, 67 (1976-77).
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bronchitis, 2 emphysema, 13 chronic sinusitis, 14 asthma, t5 and hay fe-
ver,16 and cause eye irritation resulting in corneal abrasion,'7 corneal
erosion,' 8 headaches, nausea, and vomiting.' 9
Experts emphasize, however, that even nonsmokers who are not hy-
persensitive are exposed to substances known to be harmful to humans
through the inhalation of "sidestream smoke."20 "Sidestream smoke,"
the smoke which rises from the burning end of the cigarette,2' contains
higher concentrations of many pollutants than does "mainstream
smoke"22 which is filtered by the cigarette and the smoker.2 3 Among
other components, sidestream smoke contains carbon monoxide, for-
maldehyde, nitrogen dioxide, acetaldehyde, nicotine, benzo[a]pyrene,
dimethylnitrosamine, phenols, cadmium, lead, and arsenic.24
One study of the effect of sidestream smoke on the pulmonary func-
tion of nonsmokers concluded that chronic exposure reduces the small
airway function of nonsmokers to the level of function of individuals
12. Chronic bronchitis is
a condition of the bronchial tree characterized by cough, hypersecretion of mucus, and
expectoration of sputum over a long period of time, associated with increased vulnerabil-
ity to bronchial infection; it is due to inhalation, over a prolonged period, of air contami-
nated by dust or by noxious gases which are mostly the products of combustion.
STEDMAN'S, supra note 4, at 195.
13. Emphysema is
a condition of the lung characterized by increase beyond the normal in size of air spaces
distal to the terminal bronchiole (those parts containing alveoli), with destructive
changes in their walls and reduction in their number. Clinical manifestation is undue
breathlessness on exertion ....
Id at 458.
14. Chronic sinusitis is chronic "[i]nflamation of the lining membrane of any sinus, especially
of one of the paranasal sinuses." Id at 1294.
15. Asthma is a term "now used to denote bronchial asthma" which is
a condition of the lungs in which there is widespread narrowing of airways ...; the
narrowing is due in varying degrees to contraction (spasm) of smooth muscle, edema of
the mucosa, and mucus in the lumen of the bronchi and bronchioles ....
Id at 133.
16. Hay fever is
a form of atopy characterized by an acute irritative inflammation of the muous mem-
branes of the eyes and upper respiratory passages accompanied by itching and profuse
watery secretion, followed occasionally by bronchitis and asthma ....
Id at 522.
17. The cornea is the "transparent tissue constituting the anterior sixth of the outer wall of
the eye ...." Id at 321. Abrasion is the "scraping away of a portion of the surface." Id at 4.
18. Erosion is a "wearing away or a state of being worn away . Id at 483.
19. See supra note 11 (documentation that cigarette smoke aggravates or causes these
conditions).
20. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at III.E.5-6.
21. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A RE-
PORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 11-5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT].
22. Mainstream smoke is
smoke drawn through the tobacco during inhalation, resulting in higher temperatures,
more complete combustion and a greater degree of absorption by the tobacco, the filter if
present, and the smoker himself. Mainstream smoke accounts for approximately 4% of
the total smoke produced.
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at III.E.1-2.
23. 1979 REPORT, supra note 21, at 11-6.
24. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at III.E.5-6.
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who smoke from one to ten cigarettes per day.2 5 Furthermore, in the
1982 report on the Health Consequences of Smoking, the Surgeon Gen-
eral cited two epidemiologic studies which revealed that nonsmoking
wives of smoking husbands had a statistically significant increased risk
of developing lung cancer due to their exposure to cigarette smoke.
26
The Surgeon General stated that although "the current available data
is not sufficient to conclude that passive or involuntary smoking causes
lung cancer in nonsmokers, the evidence does raise a concern about a
possible serious public health problem ."27
Findings of correlations between inhalation of sidestream smoke and
increased health risks to nonsmokers have prompted arguments that
smokers have no right to inflict the toxins of sidestream smoke on the
nonsmoking population.28 A growing number of nonsmokers are par-
ticularly concerned with the problem of smoking in the workplace,
where a nonsmoker is involuntarily subjected to known health hazards
by breathing in a smoke-filled environment. 29 This comment will ex-
amine the legal rights of nonsmokers in the workplace in California.30
Initial focus will be on recent cases which indicate that hypersensitive
nonsmokers, in certain circumstances, have a legal right to a smoke-
free work environment. Particular attention will be given to the fact
that hypersensitive nonsmokers may be deemed to be physically handi-
capped and thereby entitled to the protection of employment antidis-
crimination laws.32 This comment then will examine current law to
determine whether nonsmokers who are not hypersensitive are afforded
adequate protection.33 This will be accomplished by an examination of
constitutional issues, common-law theory, and current statutory provi-
25. Id at III.E.9 (citing Repace, The Problem of Passive Smoking, BULL. N.Y. ACAD.
MEDICINE, Dec. 1981, at 938).
26. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOK-
ING: CANCER: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 243-47 (1982).
27. Id at 251 (emphasis added).
28. See Comment, supra note 9, at 141-43.
29. 1979 REPORT, supra note 21, at 11-5.
30. The scope of this comment is limited to the situation in which two or more employees
work in an enclosed area with a common airspace and are engaged in employment that does not
require the inhalation of tobacco smoke (e.g., testing tobacco products). Omitted from discussion
are causes of action that a nonsmoking employee might bring against a smoking employee such as
nuisance, battery, or negligence. Furthermore, although issues of workers' compensation are dis-
cussed briefly at points that require their consideration, the primary concern in this comment is
the prevention of injury, not compensation for injuries already sustained. The discussion in this
comment concerns sidestream cigarette smoke only, although studies indicate that cigar and pipe
smoke contain many of the same chemical substances found in cigarette smoke. See U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 176-79, 229
(1973). Finally, this comment concerns those workplaces in California that are not subject to a
local ordinance restricting smoking in the workplace (see, e.g., San Francisco City Ord. #298-83).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 38-103.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 36-103.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 104-219.
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sions. The examination will reveal that nonsmokers in the workplace
in California are protected in some circumstances. This comment will
reveal, however, that California currently lacks an effective system of
protection for all nonsmoking workers.34 The inefficiency of a com-
mon-law action will be demonstrated in a discussion relating to the
necessity of establishing a right and fashioning a remedy in each case
in which a nonsmoker seeks protection from the toxins of sidestream
smoke in the workplace.35 The lack of effective statutory protection
then will be revealed in a discussion of various bodies of law that relate
to the health of employees generally in the workplace but fail to ade-
quately protect a nonsmoker.36 The lack of an efficient judicial remedy
and effective statutory protection for all nonsmoking workers leads to
the conclusion that legislation is necessary to accomplish the task of
protecting all nonsmokers in the workplace.37 The analysis of the
rights of nonsmokers in the workplace begins with a discussion of the
hypersensitive nonsmoker.
THE HYPERSENSITIVE NONSMOKER
Estimates of the number of people in the United States who are sen-
sitive to tobacco smoke range from 34 to 40 million.38 In the 1979
report on Smoking and Health, the Surgeon General stated that "the
existence of a true tobacco allergy has not been clearly established.
'39
Recent cases, however, have focused on protection for hypersensitive
nonsmokers who, generally speaking, are persons who suffer acute
symptoms in the presence of sidestream smoke.40
A. Federal Law: Vickers v. Veterans Administration
The case of Vickers v. VeteransAdministration,41 a recent Ninth Cir-
cuit Federal District Court decision, concerns the rights of a hypersen-
sitive nonsmoker.42 Mr. Vickers, an employee of the Veterans
Administration,4 3 suffered from an unusual sensitivity to tobacco
smoke and sought a totally smoke-free work environment." Mr. Vick-
34. See infra text accompanying notes 104-219.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 173-219.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
38. Comment, supra note 9, at 145 (citing Long Suffering Nonsmokers Fight Back, L.A.
Times, Mar. 21, 1975, §IA, at 7); L.A. Daily J., Sept. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
39. 1979 REPORT, supra note 21, at 11-31.
40. Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 690 F.2d 731, 732 (9th Cir. 1982); Vickers v.
Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 87 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
41. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
42. Id
43. Id at 86, 87.
44. Id at 89.
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ers brought suit alleging that his employer had limited his work assign-
ments and prevented his promotions because of his complaints about
the presence of tobacco smoke at his workplace.4" Mr. Vickers also
alleged that his hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke rendered him a
handicapped person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, a federal antidiscrimination statute.46  Mr. Vickers further
claimed that his employer had unlawfully discriminated against him, in
violation of the statute, by failing to provide a work environment that
was totally smoke-free.47
The federal statute at issue in Vickers prohibits discrimination
against handicapped persons by any organization that receives federal
funds or is involved in any program or activity conducted by any exec-
utive agency or by the United States Post Office.48 For purposes of the
statute, a "handicapped individual" is a person who has a physical im-
pairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities.
49
The court determined that Mr. Vickers' hypersensitivity rendered him
a handicapped person within the meaning of the statute based on the
finding that Mr. Vickers' hypersensitivity limited "at least one of his
major life activities, that is, his capacity to work in an environment
which is not completely smoke free."
50
In deciding whether Mr. Vickers had been unlawfully discriminated
against in violation of the federal statute because of his hypersensitivity
to tobacco smoke, the court looked for any unfair treatment toward Mr.
Vickers regarding his work assignments, his pay or promotions, his
complaints to his superiors about the problem, or his bringing the
action.-"
The court concluded that, although Mr. Vickers' hypersensitivity to
tobacco smoke rendered him a handicapped person for purposes of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, his employer had made reasonable accom-
modations for him in light of his handicap.52 The measures taken in-
cluded separating the desks of smokers from the desks of nonsmokers,
securing a voluntary agreement among the smokers in Mr. Vickers' of-
fice to refrain from smoking in that office, installing vents in Mr. Vick-
45. Id at 87.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§701-796i (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
47. 549 F. Supp. at 87.
48. 29 U.S.C. §794 (Supp. V 1981).
49. Id §706(7)(B).
50. 549 F. Supp. at 87. Nonsmoking plaintiffs were held not to be "handicapped individuals"
in GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 256 S.E.2d 477, 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). The plaintiffs there,
however, did not ask for relief in the workplace specifically, which seems to have been the disposi-
tive factor in Vickers.
51. 549 F. Supp. at 87.
52. Id The court merely assumed, but did not decide, that the Veterans Administration was
under a duty to make reasonable accommodations to the plaintiff.
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ers' office in an attempt to withdraw tobacco smoke, purchasing an air
purifier, and offering Mr. Vickers another job. 3 The court stated that
if Congress had enacted legislation forbidding the smoking of tobacco
in any office space, or if the Veterans Administration had adopted that
type of policy, the court would have readily enforced it. 4
Despite the fact that the federal antidiscrimination statute would not
encompass all nonsmokers because not all nonsmokers are hypersensi-
tive and thus handicapped, the Vickers decision has been heralded as at
least a partial victory by antismoking groups because of the finding by
the court that, for purposes of the federal statute, the hypersensitive
plaintiff was a handicapped person. 5 Although the federal statute only
prohibits discrimination against a handicapped person in programs
that receive federal funds, the Vickers finding that the hypersensitive
plaintiff was a handicapped person is of particular interest when
viewed in light of California law.
B. California Law: Analogizing Vickers
In California, discrimination in employment on the basis of physical
handicap is made unlawful by the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (CFEHA) 6 Under the CFEHA, an employer57 cannot
refuse to hire or employ a person, refuse to select a person for a train-
ing program leading to employment, or discharge a person from em-
ployment or a training program leading to employment, or
discriminate in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment on the basis of a physical handicap if that person is able to
perform the job in question. 8 Before a hypersensitive nonsmoker can
be found to have rights under the CFEHA, two issues must be ex-
plored: (1) whether hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke constitutes a
physical handicap for purposes of the CFEHA; and (2) whether hyper-
sensitive nonsmokers are expressly excluded from the purview of the
CFEHA by the provision which excludes coverage for those who, be-
cause of a physical handicap, are unable to perform their duties.
1. Hypersensitivity: A Physical Handicap
The initial issue to be addressed in ascertaining what rights a hyper-
53. Id at 88.
54. Id at 89.
55. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
56. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§12900-12996 [hereinafter referred to as the CFEHA].
57. For purposes of the CFEHA, an "employer" includes the state and any of its political or
civil subdivisions, cities, and any person who regularly employs five or more persons, but does not
include a religious association or corporation not organized for profit. Id §12926(c).
58. Id §12940. For purposes of the CFEHA, "physical handicap" includes "impairment of
... physical ability because of... loss of function or coordination." Id §12926(h).
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sensitive nonsmoker might have under the CFEHA is the question of
whether the definition of "physical handicap," for purposes of the
CFEHA, would include hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke. As dis-
cussed above, for purposes of the federal antidiscrimination statute,
Vickers determined that a hypersensitive nonsmoking employee is a
handicapped person. 9 A recent California Supreme Court case involv-
ing statutory construction of the CFEHA indicates the likelihood that
the definition of "physical handicap" for purposes of the CFEHA also
would encompass hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke.60
a. Statutory Construction
In American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission,6 the California Supreme Court construed the term
"physical handicap" for purposes of the CFEHA very broadly in a case
involving employment discrimination on the basis of the plaintiffs high
blood pressure. 62 The court reiterated the legislative declaration that
the public policy of the state is "to protect and safeguard the right and
opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment with-
out discrimination or abridgment on account of. . .physical handicap
... *63 The court also noted that the Legislature determined that the
provisions of this body of law are to "be construed liberally" for the
accomplishment of its purposes.6' In concluding that high blood pres-
sure is a physical handicap for purposes of the CFEHA, the court
stated that the Legislature did not restrict the definition to major ills or
defects .6  Furthermore, the court stated that obviously a condition of
the body which makes achievement unusually difficult is a physical
handicap.66
In light of the liberal construction by the California Supreme Court
of the term "physical handicap" for purposes of the CFEHA, a Califor-
nia court could find that hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke is also
within the purview of the CFEHA. Additional support for this conten-
tion is provided by an examination of the regulations contained in the
California Administrative Code which implement the CFEHA.67
59. See supra text accompanying note 50.
60. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651
P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982).
61. Id
62. Id at 608-10, 651 P.2d at 1154-56, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 348-50.
63. Id at 610, 651 P.2d at 1156, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE §12920).
64. Id at 610, 651 P.2d at 1155-56, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (quoting CAL. Gov'T CODE
§12993(a)).
65. Id at 609, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
66. Id
67. 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§7285.0-8502.
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b. Administrative Regulations
Section 7293.5 of Title 2 of the California Administrative Code states
that the "regulations are designed to assure discrimination-free access
to employment opportunities notwithstanding any individual's actual
or perceived physical handicap."6 Section 7293.6 of Title 2 defines a
"handicapped individual" as one who has a physical handicap which
substantially limits one or more major life activities. 69 The definition
provided in section 7293.6 employs substantially the same language as
does the definition of "handicapped individual" at issue in Vickers."
Furthermore, "physical handicap" is defined in section 7293.6 in sub-
stantially the same language as "physical impairment" is defined in the
federal regulation which implements the antidiscrimination statute at
issue in Vickers.71 Section 7293.6 also specifies that "major life activi-
ties" include functions such as working and that "[p]rimary attention is
to be given to those life activities that affect employability, or otherwise
present a barrier to employment or advancement. 72
Thus, an analogy can be drawn between the CFEHA and the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that was at issue in Vickers in light of the
fact that the regulations adopted to implement the California law con-
tain language substantially the same as the language in the federal stat-
ute and regulation. Based on this analogy and on the liberal
construction of "physical handicap," by the California Supreme
Court73 a hypersensitive nonsmoker should be found to be a handi-
capped person within the meaning of the California law, as Mr. Vickers
was found to be a handicapped person for purposes of the federal law.
A hypersensitive nonsmoker would be deemed to be physically handi-
capped under the CFEHA because his or her hypersensitivity substan-
tially limits a major life activity, that is, the "capacity to work in an
environment which is not completely smoke free."
'74
2. Hypersensitivity. An Environmental Limitation
Although a hypersensitive nonsmoker may be deemed physically
handicapped for purposes of the CFEHA, the fact remains that nothing
in the CFEHA precludes an employer from discriminating against a
person who, "because of his or her physical handicap, is unable to per-
68. Id §7293.5(b).
69. Id §7293.6j)(1).
70. See supra text accompanying note 49.
71. Compare 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §7293.6 with 45 C.F.R. §84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1982).
72. 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §7293.6(g).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
74. See 549 F. Supp. at 87.
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form his or her duties."75 Thus, for example, it would not be unlawful
for an employer to refuse to hire a blind person for a job as a film
editor because the duties of that position must be performed by a
sighted person. On the other hand, it may be deemed an unlawfully
discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse to hire as a typist a
person who suffers from paraplegia. Thus, the particular exclusion
must be tailored to the individual characteristics of the person in-
volved, with a view toward the specific requirements of the job to be
performed.76
Hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke is a unique type of handicap in
that the manifestations of hypersensitivity occur only in the presence of
tobacco smoke.77 Due to the physical handicap of hypersensitivity, a
hypersensitive nonsmoker is unable to perform the duties of employ-
ment in a smoke-filled work environment. 78 That inability, however,
should not exclude a hypersensitive nonsmoker from the protections
afforded by the CFEHA. An examination of recent court decisions
reveals a way of characterizing hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke that
would result in affording the hypersensitive nonsmoker protection
under the CFEHA, notwithstanding the exclusion.
The California appellate case of Alexander v. Unemployment Insur-
ance Appeals Board79 recognized the rights of a hypersensitive non-
smoker. The case involved the payment of state unemployment
insurance benefits to an allergic nonsmoker who terminated her em-
ployment because her employer neglected to enforce the no-smoking
policy it had instituted for the plaintiff's work area. 80 In affirming the
trial court decision to grant unemployment insurance benefits to the
plaintiff, the appellate court stated that the plaintiff "has good cause for
rejecting work where cigarette smoke is present because such work is
not 'suitable employment' since it would be injurious to her health."'
In part, the court based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff's physi-
cian testified that the plaintiff could engage in full-time work in her
occupation if the conditions were smoke-free.82 Thus, Alexander im-
plicitly characterized hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke as an environ-
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE §12940(a)(1).
76. See generaly Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App.
3d 791, 798, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (1981) (discussion of an employer's right to refuse to hire
persons whose physical handicap prevents them from performing their duties in a manner which
does not endanger their health).
77. See generally Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 690 F.2d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 1982)
(regarding discussion of plaintiffs disability at her worksi'e).
78. See id
79. 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980).
80. Id at 99-100, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
81. LId at 100, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
82. Id
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mental limitation rather than aphysical limitation, because the plaintiff
was only limited by the conditions of her work environment and could
perform the duties of her job in a smoke-free environment. 83 The im-
pact of this finding is strengthened by the fact that, if the court had
examined only the plaintiff's physical condition and not the work envi-
ronment, the plaintiff would have been denied the unemployment ben-
efits she sought because she would have been found to have refused
"suitable work." 84
Although Alexander only implicitly characterized hypersensitivity as
an environmental limitation, a California court likely would follow the
lead of a recent federal court decision85 which explicitly characterized
hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke as an environmental, rather than
physical, limitation. In Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Board,86 a
Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals case, the plaintiff sought fed-
eral employment disability benefits, claiming that her reaction to ciga-
rette smoke rendered her disabled.87 The plaintiff was diagnosed as
suffering from "asthmatic bronchitis with hyperirritable airways"88 due
to her reaction to cigarette smoke.8 9 One physician stated that requir-
ing the plaintiff to return to work at her previous job, in an office in
which many employees smoked, would endanger her health.90 Parodi
explicitly characterized the plaintiff's hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke
as an environmental limitation,91 as opposed to a physical limitation.92
The Parodi court stated that "[u]nlike a person with a physical limita-
tion, a person with an environmental limitation can physically perform
the work in a proper environment. 93
Neither the Alexander court nor the Parodi court examined hyper-
sensitivity with regard to the CFEHA. In light of the fact that the pro-
visions of the CFEHA are to be construed liberally 94 and the fact that
California courts are beginning to recognize the rights of nonsmokers,9
a person's hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke should be considered an
environmental limitation, rather than a physical limitation, for pur-
83. See generally id (Plaintiff was willing to accept, and was looking for, work where smok-
ing was not permitted.)
84. Id
85. Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982).
86. .d
87. Id at 732.
88. Id at 733.
89. Id
90. Id
91. Id at 738.
92. Id
93. Id
94. See supra text accompanying note 64.
95. See generally Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982);
Alexander v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980).
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poses of the CFEHA, along the lines of that characterization in Alexan-
der and Parodi. Lending additional support for this argument is the
fact that the activity which triggers the handicapping response in hy-
persensitive nonsmokers is an activity that is altogether unnecessary
and unrelated to the performance of the duties of employment. 96 Thus,
a person who suffers from hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke should not
be considered one who, "because of his or her handicap, is unable to
perform his or her duties."97 In the proper environment, that is, a
smoke-free workplace, a hypersensitive employee is able to properly
perform the duties of employment.
Based on the cases discussed above, protection afforded by the
CFEHA to nonsmokers would require an initial finding that the partic-
ular nonsmoker is hypersensitive, and therefore, handicapped. Once
that finding is made, an employer may not discriminate on the basis of
that hypersensitivity by refusing to hire the nonsmoker or to select the
nonsmoker for a training program leading to employment, or by dis-
charging the nonsmoker from employment or a training program lead-
ing to employment.98 Furthermore, the employer may not discriminate
against the nonsmoker in compensation, conditions, or privileges of
employment.99 The employer also must make reasonable accommoda-
tions to the hypersensitivity of the nonsmoker, unless it would produce
undue hardship to the employer."° Reasonable accommodations may
include such things as reassignment of the nonsmoking employee and
minor structural alterations.l°1
As mentioned above, the protections afforded by the CFEHA would
not be available to a nonsmoker who is not hypersensitive, since the
application of the CFEHA to the situation faced by a nonsmoker in the
workplace requires a finding that the nonsmoker is physically handi-
capped. Furthermore, although a hypersensitive nonsmoker may be
deemed physically handicapped for purposes of the CFEHA, not all
employers are bound by the provisions of the CFEHA. The CFEHA
applies only to the state and any of its political or civil subdivisions, to
cities, and to those employers who regularly employ five or more per-
sons.102 Religious associations and nonprofit corporations are specifi-
96. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408, 411 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
97. CAL. GOV'T CODE §12940(a)(1).
98. Id §12940(a).
99. Id
100. 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §7293.9.
101. Id §7293.9(a)(2), (b)(1). Once the aggrieved employee exhausts the administrative reme-
dies set forth in the CFEHA, he or she may then bring a civil action. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§12960-12976.
102. CAL. GOV'T CODE §12926(c).
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cally excluded."°3 Therefore, it follows that a hypersensitive non-
smoker whose employer is not bound by the provisions of the CFEHA
is in the same legal position in California as is a nonsmoker who is not
hypersensitive. This leads to the question of whether the law ade-
quately protects a nonsmoker who is not hypersensitive from the toxins
of sidestream smoke at his or her workplace in California.
THE NONSMOKER WHO Is NOT HYPERSENSITIVE
Reactions in nonsmokers who are not hypersensitive and who are
subjected to sidestream smoke include burning eyes, nasal congestion,
rhinitis,'14 sore throat, cough, headache and nausea.10 5 Furthermore,
the presence of known carcinogens contained in tobacco smoke has
been found to present long-term health risks not only to the hypersensi-
tive nonsmoker, but to the nonsmoker who is not hypersensitive as
well.'0 6 Current state law in California does not effectively protect a
nonsmoker who is not hypersensitive from the toxins emitted and the
risks posed by sidestream smoke in the workplace.l0 7 An examination
of constitutional issues, common-law theory, and current statutory pro-
visions will reveal the lack of effective protection for all nonsmokers
and the need for legislation to provide that necessary protection. 08
A. Constitutional Bases
Arguments have been made that a nonsmoking employee who is
subjected to sidestream smoke is denied his or her rights under the
United States Constitution."° One theory that has been advanced is
that the nonsmoker is deprived of life and liberty without due process
of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments." 10 The argument is
that the right to life implies a right to be free from the toxins which
endanger life and a right to live in an environment which is not hazard-
ous."' Another constitutional challenge has been brought on the the-
ory that a nonsmoker is deprived of a fundamental right, based on the
idea that the right to a clean environment is protected as one of the
103. Id
104. Rhinitis is the "inflammation of the nasal mucous membrane." STEDMAN'S, supra note 4,
at 1232.
105. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at IIl.E.9.
106. Id at III.E.8-9.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 119-219.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 109-219.
109. See Federal Employees for Non-Smokers Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F. Supp.
181, 183-84 (D.D.C. 1978), aft'd, 598 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979);
Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Expo. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 717 (E.D. La. 1976).
110. 418 F. Supp. at 718-20.
111. See Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. 20794,
20794 (D. Mont. 1970); Comment, supra note 11, at 73.
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unenumerated fundamental rights retained by the people under the
ninth amendment.1 12 A group of nonsmoking federal employees based
a constitutional challenge on still another theory-that their right
under the first amendment to petition their government for redress of
grievances was infringed by the employers' failure to make smoke-
filled hallways and meeting rooms safe. 1 3 Nonsmokers have not been
successful, however, in their challenges based on the United States
Constitution. 114
An initial barrier to a nonsmoker's successful constitutional chal-
lenge is that an action brought under the first, fifth, ninth, or fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution requires a finding of gov-
ernment action.1 5 In the usual situation, the nonsmoker's grievance is
based on thefailure of the government to regulate smoking. The inac-
tion of the government would not satisfy the requirement under current
state action theory. 6 Additionally, courts that have decided the issue
have held that there is no constitutional right to a healthful environ-
ment or to be free from toxic chemicals.' ' Courts have consistently
refused to recognize any federal constitutional rights asserted by
nonsmokers." 8
The California Constitution likewise does not expressly recognize the
right of an individual to a healthful environment.' The only refer-
112. 418 F. Supp. at 721; Comment, supra note 11, at 74.
113. 446 F. Supp. at 183-84.
114. See 446 F. Supp. 181, 185 (D.D.C. 1978), ar'd 598 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 926 (1979); 418 F. Supp. 716, 722 (E.D. La. 1976).
115. Envil Defense Fund, 3 Envti. L. Rep. at 20794-95.
116. See id; Axel-Lute, Legislation Against Smoking Pollution, 6 ENVTL. AFF. 345, 351 (1977-
78); Comment, supra note 11, at 75.
117. In Federal Employees for Non-Smokers Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F. Supp.
181, 185 (D.D.C. 1978), aft'd, 598 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979)), the
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of first and fifth amendment violations. The court quoted an
earlier decision stating
if this Court were to recognize that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide the
judicial means to prohibit smoking, it would be creating a legal avenue, heretofore un-
available, through which an individual could attempt to regulate the social habits of his
neighbor. This Court is not prepared to accept the proposition that life-tenured mem-
bers of the federal judiciary should engage in such basic adjustments of individual be-
havior and liberties. . . . For the Constitution to be read to protect nonsmokers from
inhaling tobacco smoke would be to broaden the rights of the Constitution to limits
heretofore unheard of, and to engage in that type of adjustment of individual liberties
better left to the people acting through legislative processes.
Id (citing Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Expo. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 720-22 (E.D. La.
1976)). In Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Expo. Dist., a federal district court, in dismissing a
complaint brought by nonsmokers based on constitutional challenges, stated that "the courts have
never seriously considered the right to a clean environment to be constitutionally protected ....
It is well established that the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill." Id
118. See supra note 114.
119. Compare section 2 of article I I of the State Constitution of Illinois which provides:
Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this
right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings
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ence at all applicable to nonsmokers in the California Constitution is
contained in section 4 of article 14, which pertains to workers' compen-
sation.1 20 Although an injured nonsmoker might seek workers' com-
pensation based on statutes that implement the mandate of section 4
that "a complete system of workers' compensation includes . . . full
provision for securing safety in places of employment,"12 1 the primary
concern of nonsmoking employees is the prevention of injury to them-
selves from the sidestream smoke generated by the smoking of their
fellow employees. Section 4 of article 14 creates no rights in one who is
not yet injured. Rather, this section is a grant of power to the Legisla-
ture to create and enforce a system of workers' compensation through
appropriate legislation. 122 Therefore, although the importance of
safety in the workplace is acknowledged in the California Constitution,
the California Constitution affords no protection to the nonsmoker who
seeks theprevention of injury. This lack of constitutional protection for
the nonsmoking employee leads to an examination of other bodies of
law to determine a nonsmoker's rights in the workplace.
B. Common Law
Under common law in California, employers are obligated to furnish
safe workplaces for their employees. 123 In other jurisdictions, the same
common-law duty has supported a cause of action brought by non-
smoking employees against their employers to enjoin smoking in the
workplace.12 4 In the New Jersey trial court case of Shimp v. New Jersey
Bell Telephone Co. ,2' the plaintiff, a secretary whose employer permit-
ted fellow employees to smoke while they worked at desks close to the
plaintiff's, sought an injunction to require her employer to restrict
smoking to a nonwork area. 26 The court held that the plaintiff had a
common-law right to a safe working environment 27 and granted the
injunction.' In the recent case of Smith v. Western Electric Co. ,129 a
Missouri appellate court overturned the trial court dismissal of a suit
brought by the plaintiff to enjoin his employer from exposing him to
subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by
law.
120. CAL. CONST. art. 14, §4.
121. Id
122. 'The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary power. . . to create and enforce
a complete system of workers' compensation, by appropriate legislation .... " Id
123. Devens v. Goldberg, 33 Cal. 2d 173, 178, 199 P.2d 943, 947 (1948).
124. Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982); Shimp v. New Jersey Bell
Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
125. 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
126. Id at 409-10.
127. Id at 413.
128. Id at 416.
129. 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982).
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tobacco smoke in the workplace. 30 The employee had alleged that to-
bacco smoke in the workplace is hazardous to the health of the employ-
ees and that, by failing to eliminate the tobacco smoke, the employer
had breached the common-law duty to provide a reasonably safe work-
place. 13' The court concluded that if the facts alleged were true, the
employee had stated a cause of action for breach of the common-law
duty of an employer to provide a reasonably safe workplace.' 3z Rely-
ing on the Shimp case, the Smith court stated that if the plaintifi's alle-
gations were true, an injunction would be the appropriate remedy.33
California courts have not considered whether a nonsmoking em-
ployee is denied the common-law right to a reasonably safe workplace
when the employee is forced to work in a smoke-filled environment.
Due to lack of precedent on this issue, a California court could use
Smith and Shimp as model cases once several issues have been re-
solved.' 34 The issues to be examined are as follows: (1) whether the
presence of tobacco smoke would be included in the California com-
mon-law definition of an unsafe workplace; (2) whether an employer
may defend on the grounds of assumption of the risk or the fellow ser-
vant rule; and (3) whether injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy.
Before proceeding to an examination of these issues, however, a review
of the duty of the employer in California would provide helpful
background.
The common-law duty of an employer in California to furnish a safe
workplace for his or her employees requires that the workplace be rea-
sonably safe, judged by the character of the work itself.'35 The law
does not permit an employer to take chances on his or her employee's
safety. 136 The employer's duty is measured by his or her possession,
use and control of the premises.1 37 Since the activity of smoking in the
workplace occurs on premises within the control of the employer, the
duty of the employer to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition comes into play. The first issue to be addressed is whether
the presence of tobacco smoke would be included in the common-law
definition of an unsafe workplace in California, thereby constituting a
breach of the employer's common-law duty.
130. Id at 14.
131. Id at 12.
132. Id at 13-14.
133. Id at 13.
134. See Comment, supra note 11, at 92 (discussion of the applicability of the Shimp holding
in other jurisdictions).
135. Spivok v. Independent Sash & Door Co., 173 Cal. 438,440, 160 P. 565, 566 (1916); Valen-
tine v. Hayes, 37 Cal. App. 42, 46, 173 P. 410, 412 (1918).
136. Brown v. Sharp-Hauser Contracting Co., 159 Cal. 89, 94, 112 P. 874, 877 (1910).
137. Lang v. Lilley & Thurston Co., 20 Cal. App. 223, 230, 128 P. 1028, 1030-31 (1912).
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California courts have not considered whether the presence of to-
bacco smoke renders a workplace unsafe in violation of an employer's
common-law duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condi-
tion. An examination of the rationale set forth in Shimp, with a view
toward the California common law, indicates that an employer in Cali-
fornia could be found to have breached the common-law duty to pro-
vide a reasonably safe workplace by allowing employees to work in a
smoke-filled environment. The common law in California requires
that the workplace be reasonably safe, with regard to the character of the
work. 3 In Shimp, the court distinguished the facts before it from Ca-
nonico v. Celanese Corp. ofAmerica,139 a New Jersey case in which the
plaintiff was denied recovery because his injury was caused by cellulose
dust, a natural nontoxic byproduct of the employer's manufacturing
process. 40 In granting the injunction in Shimp requiring that smoking
be confined to a nonwork area, the court noted that cigarette smoke,
unlike cellulose dust, is not a natural byproduct of office work and that
the plaintiffs workplace was contaminated with an unnecessary toxic
substance.
41
Since the issue of whether the presence of tobacco smoke renders a
workplace unsafe is one of first impression in California, a California
court should employ the rationale set forth in Shimp and find that, be-
cause tobacco smoke is not a natural byproduct of an employer's busi-
ness, the character of the work allows a safer environment than that
which is provided when smoking is permitted. The workplace may be
made safer by prohibiting a nonessential activity that (1) has been
shown to have adverse health effects on otherwise healthy individu-
als, 142 and (2) releases known carcinogens into the air, presenting the
possibility of long-term health risks. 143 Therefore, an employer who
permits a nonessential activity which releases unnecessary toxic sub-
stances into the air of the workplace would be "taking a chance on an
employee's safety,'" which California common law forbids.' 4 The
employer would then be held in breach of the common-law duty to
furnish a reasonably safe workplace. Once the employer is found to
have breached this common-law duty, the relevant defenses must be
examined.
Two defenses which appear to be applicable to the situation are as-
138. 173 Cal. at 440, 160 P. at 566; 37 Cal. App. at 46, 173 P. at 412.
139. 78 A.2d 411 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1951).
140. 368 A.2d at411.
141. Id
142. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27, 104, 105.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 106.
144. 159 Cal. at 94, 112 P. at 877.
145. Id
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sumption of the risk and the fellow servant rule. In defending a cause
of action based on assumption of the risk, an employer would demon-
strate that the employee continued to work in the smoke-filled environ-
ment with knowledge of the hazardous condition and that the
employee "assumed the risk" of the consequences. An employer who
defends on the ground of the fellow servant rule would assert the negli-
gence of the employee's fellow servant as a defense to the cause of ac-
tion against the employer.
An employer who permits an employee to smoke, and thereby con-
taminate the air of the workplace with the toxins of sidestream smoke,
cannot defend an action brought by a nonsmoking employee on the
ground of assumption of the risk or the fellow servant rule. With re-
gard to actions brought by employees against their employers, both de-
fenses have been abolished by statute in California.1 46 Therefore, an
employer cannot assert as a defense the fact that an employee contin-
ued to work with the knowledge of the unsafe condition of his or her
workplace, nor can an employer assert the negligence of an employee's
fellow servant as a defense to the action. If no defense is found appli-
cable, an appropriate remedy must be fashioned for the aggrieved
employee.
Reported California decisions do not contain a case in which an em-
ployee has sought an order requiring an employer to prohibit smoking
in the workplace. For that reason, California courts could rely on the
reasoning in Shimp and Smith, where injunctive relief was considered
to be an appropriate remedy in the situation faced by a nonsmoker in a
smoke-filled workplace.
147
The requirements for the grant of injunctive relief in California are
identical to the requirements set forth in Smith .148 Injunctive relief is
allowed in California when pecuniary compensation is inadequate,
1 49
when the amount of compensation that would afford an adequate rem-
edy is extremely difficult to ascertain, 50 or when there is a presence of
irreparable injury.15 In considering whether injunctive relief would be
an appropriate remedy, Smith characterized the plaintiff's deteriorating
health as "irreparable" and as harm for which money damages could
not adequately compensate. 52 The court stated that
[m]oney damages, even though inadequate, are the best possible rem-
146. CAL. LAB. CODE §2801.
147. 643 S.W.2d at 13; 368 A.2d at 411-12, 416.
148. 643 S.W.2d at 13.
149. CAL. CIv. CODE §3422.
150. Id
151. People v. Paramount Citrus Ass'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 399, 412, 305 P.2d 135, 144 (1957).
152. 643 S.W.2d at 13.
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edy once physical damage is done, but they are certainly inadequate
to compensate permanent injury which could have been prevented.
Plaintiff should not be required to await the harm's fruition before he
is entitled to seek an adequate remedy.'
53
ShiMp earlier had characterized as irreparable the potential harm of
sidestream smoke.' 54 Shimp contrasted the damaging effect of
sidestream smoke on employees with the damaging effect on the em-
ployer's sensitive office equipment and noted that, while replacement
parts are readily available for the office equipment, a human lung, eye,
and heart are virtually irreplaceable.155
In California, a plaintiff need not show that injury is inevitable.'56
California courts have granted injunctive relief upon a showing of
threatened injury.'57 The scientific data that are available today are
sufficient to show that sidestream smoke threatens irreparable harm to
all nonsmokers.1 58 Therefore, an employee could obtain an injunction
requiring an employer to prohibit smoking in the workplace unless the
action is precluded by statutes pertaining to workers' compensation.
The California Constitution provides that a complete system of
workers' compensation includes adequate provision for the comfort,
health, safety, and general welfare of all workers to relieve them from
the consequences of injury arising out of employment. 59 Liability is
imposed on the employer, regardless of negligence, when the condi-
tions of compensation occur.
160
In the ordinary case, a nonrhypersensitive nonsmoker seeks to prevent
injury to himself or herself. The harm has not yet manifested itself in
disease or injury for which compensation would be sought.
Section 3601 of the California Labor Code provides that "[w]here the
conditions of compensation"' 6' exist, the exclusive remedy is the right
to recovery under workers' compensation law, with specified excep-
tions.'6 2 Where conditions of compensation do not occur, the em-
ployer's liability is governed by the law of negligence. 63 The New
153. Id (emphasis added).
154. See 368 A.2d at 416.
155. Id The plaintiff in Shimp was allergic to cigarette smoke. 368 A.2d at 410. However,
judicial notice was taken in Shimp of the toxic nature and dangerous effect of sidestream smoke
on nonsmokersgeneral/y, not merely specifically on this particular plaintiff. "The employees' right
to a safe working environment makes it clear that smoking must be forbidden in the work area."
Id at 416 (emphasis added).
156. Nicholson v. Getchell, 96 Cal. 394, 396, 31 P. 265, 266 (1892).
157. Ernst & Ernst v. Carlson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 125, 128, 55 Cal. Rptr. 626, 628 (1966).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 3-27, 104-106.
159. CAL. CONST. art. 14, §4.
160. CAL. LAB. CODE §3600.
161. Id §3601(a).
162. Id
163. Id §3602; Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal. 2d 159, 173, 231 P.2d 484, 493 (1951).
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Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act at issue in Shimp contains an ex-
clusivity of remedies provision similar to that provided in the Califor-
nia Workers' Compensation Act.164 The New Jersey Act provides that
persons bound by its provisions surrender "their rights to any other
method, form or amount of compensation . -"165 Shimp held that
the New Jersey Act makes the workers' compensation system the exclu-
sive method of obtaining monetary damages only and concluded that
the New Jersey Act "becomes the exclusive remedy for the employee
when the hazard has ripened into injury."'1 66 Likewise, a California
court could deem that the conditions of compensation do not exist
when an employee seeks an order to require his or her employer to
prohibit smoking because no injury has yet manifested itself. There-
fore, the exclusivity of remedies provision contained in the California
Workers' Compensation Act would not be applicable to the situation.
Since an employee would not be precluded by the Workers' Com-
pensation Act from seeking injunctive relief, and the potential harm
posed by sidestream smoke is irreparable harm for which money dam-
ages are inadequate, a California court should follow the reasoning in
the Shimp and Smith cases and grant an order requiring an employer
to prohibit smoking in the workplace.
Despite the fact that an employee may obtain an injunction prohibit-
ing smoking in the workplace, instituting a common-law action is an
inefficient method of protecting all workers. One commentator has
suggested that "the necessity of resorting to the judicial system for re-
lief reflects the impotence of existing laws and the need for additional
statutory regulation to protect the rights of the nonsmoking citizens."
6 7
For the courts to consider the plight of nonsmokers on a case-by-case
basis would result in a multiplicity of lawsuits and would burden the
judicial system with a problem that could be and should be solved leg-
islatively. Courts that have considered the problem faced by non-
smokers in the workplace have also suggested that the solution is better
left to the legislative process. 68 The saving of time, money, and most
importantly, the health of nonsmokers, would be substantial if each
affected nonsmoker were not required to institute a court action to es-
tablish his or her rights and ensure the enforcement of a remedy. The
establishment of the rights of nonsmoking employees on a case-by-case
basis and the necessity of fashioning an appropriate remedy in each
164. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:15-8 with CAL. LAB. CODE §3601.
165. N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:15-8.
166. 368 A.2d at 412 (emphasis added).
167. Comment, Employee's Right to a Safe, Healthy Work Environment, 8 CuM. L. REV. 579,
588 (1977).
168. 446 F. Supp. at 185; 418 F. Supp. at 722.
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individual case brought to court is an inefficient and wasteful use of the
time and resources of a court.
Other states have responded to the inefficiency of bringing a com-
mon-law action by enacting statutes that expressly protect the non-
smoker at his or her place of employment.169 These statutes expressly
recognize the rights of nonsmokers in the workplace, thereby eliminat-
ing the necessity of bringing a court action merely to establish these
rights. 7 ° Furthermore, the statutes expressly prescribe the remedy.'
7 '
An examination of California statutory law reveals that, although some
employees are afforded protection in certain situations, California lacks
an effective means of protecting all workers.'7 2
C. California Statutory Law
Recently enacted California statutory law expressly protects non-
smoking state employees,' public school teachers, 174 and other school
employees. 75 A review of these statutes reveals the legislative recogni-
tion of the hazards posed to nonsmokers by sidestream smoke and con-
cern for the health of employees generally in the workplace.
In 1982, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 2980
which affords protection to nonsmoking state employees.' 76 The bill,
which added section 19262 to the Government Code, contained the leg-
islative acknowledgement that "[h]ealth hazards induced by involun-
tary smoking [the inhalation of sidestream smoke] include lung cancer,
respiratory infection, increased episodes of decreased exercise toler-
ance, decreased pulmonary function, bronchoconstriction, and
bronchospasm." '1 7 The Legislature further found that "[n]onsmokers
with allergies, respiratory diseases, and those who suffer other ill effects
of breathing secondhand [sidestream] smoke may experience a loss of
job productivity or may be forced to take periodic sick leave because of
reactions to secondhand smoke." 71 The law now requires each state
department to adopt either the existing policy of the State Personnel
Board on smoking, 179 or its own policy. The policy must address the
169. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§144.413-144.414; NEB. REv. STAT. §§71-5704, 71-5707; UTAH CODE
ANN. §§76-10-101, 76-10-106.
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§144.413-144.414; NEB. REV. STAT. §§71-5704, 71-5707; UTAH CODE
ANN. §§76-10-101, 76-10-106.
171. MINN. STAT. ANN. §144.417; NEB. REV. STAT. §71-5713; UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-110.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 173-219.
173. CAL. STAT. 1982, c. 756, §2, at -.
174. CAL. STAT. 1982, c. 907, §§1, 2, at -.
175. Id
176. CAL. STAT. 1982, c. 756, §2, at -.
177. Id §1, at-.
178. Id
179. The State Personnel Board policy provides, with regard to a policy to be implemented at
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rights of nonsmokers to a smoke-free environment in meetings and at
work stations and allow for administration of the policy and for the
resolution of conflicts.1 80
In 1982, the California Legislature also afforded protection to Cali-
fornia public school teachers and other school employees through the
enactment of Senate Bill 1593 which added sections 35176.5 and
35176.6 to the Education Code. l"' Section 35176.5 requires the gov-
erning board of every school district to adopt policies regarding the
designation of employee smoking areas or lounges at each school
site. "'82 Section 35176.6 prohibits teachers or other school employees
from smoking on the grounds of public schools except in the areas des-
ignated by the governing board.
18 3
Despite the legislative recognition of the health hazards posed by
sidestream smoke, express protection is not afforded by the Legislature
to those who are not state employees, public school teachers, or other
school employees. As discussed below, however, employees in certain
business establishments may be afforded protection.
The California Indoor Clean Air Act of 1976184 bans smoking in
specified public places. Not only does this law protect the public in
those specified places, the law also protects, to some extent, employees
who work in those places, although smoking is only prohibited in a
certain percentage of the areas.185 The provisions of the California In-
door Clean Air Act pertain to specified health facilities, restaurants,
motion picture theaters, and retail food production and marketing es-
tablishments during hours open to the public."86 Although the Califor-
nia Indoor Clean Air Act was not enacted expressly for the purpose of
protecting nonsmoking employees, persons who work in the specified
places are protected by the application and enforcement of the law at
their workplaces.
Thus, unless one is employed in a state agency, in a public school, or
work stations, that each supervisor must discuss the smoking situation with each employee and
exercise specified options to accommodate everyone's needs. The specified options include
designating specific well-ventilated smoking areas, designating no-smoking areas, rearranging of-
fice layout to separate smokers from nonsmokers, and establishing "smoke breaks" in lieu of stan-
dard breaks. The State Personnel Board policy further provides for conflict resolution to be
determined by designated management employees, a smoker, and a nonsmoker. (State Personnel
Board Smoking Policy, Jan. 1980) (copy on file at the Pacoc Law Journal).
180. CAL. GOV'T CODE §19262.
181. CAL. STAT. 1982, c. 907, §§l, 2, AT-.
182. CAL. EDUC. CODE §35176.5.
183. Id §35176.6.
184. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§25940-25947.
185. Id §§25942-25944.
186. Id By initiative measures in 1978 and 1980, attempts were made to add sections to the
Health and Safety Code that would have prohibited smoking in enclosed places of employment
with specified exceptions. Both initiatives failed passage.
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in a place of employment specified in the California Indoor Clean Air
Act, he or she is not protected by an express provision of California
statutory law. Whether a nonsmoker is implicitly protected by some
other provision of statutory law requires an examination of statutes
pertaining to the health of employees generally in the workplace.
The Hazardous Substances Information and Training Act' 87 con-
tains legislative findings that employees are faced with risks to their
health due to certain hazardous substances in the workplace and that
employers do not always have requisite data regarding these substances
to render a workplace safe.'88 This body of law sets forth the duties
required of all employers with respect to the use of hazardous sub-
stances in the workplace. 8 9
Unfortunately for the aggrieved nonsmoking employee, the Hazard-
ous Substances Information and Training Act is expressly inapplicable
to hazardous substances contained in "products intended for personal
consumption by employees in the workplace . ... ,"19o Since tobacco
products are products intended for personal consumption, they are ex-
cluded from the purview of the Hazardous Substances Information and
Training Act. Therefore, nonsmokers are not protected by this law de-
spite the fact that the implementing administrative regulations list sub-
stances which are found in sidestream smoke.' 9' Although a
nonsmoker would not be protected by the Hazardous Substances Infor-
mation and Training Act, the presence of known carcinogens contained
in sidestream smoke might lead a nonsmoking employee to question
whether he or she is protected by the Occupational Carcinogens Con-
trol Act of 1976.192
The Occupational Carcinogens Control Act of 1976 provides for pro-
tective regulations concerning the use of carcinogens to carry out the
express legislative intent that "the state shall exercise strong leadership
in preventing employees, employers, and other persons from being ex-
posed to carcinogens. '93 The Occupational Carcinogens Control Act
sets forth a list of specific applicable carcinogenic substances and, in
addition to those listed, includes those carcinogenic substances for
187. CAL. LAB. CODE §§6360-6399.9. The Hazardous Substances Information and Training
Act is contained in the California Occupational Health and Safety Act which is discussed in detail
below. See infra text accompanying notes 202-19.
188. CAL. LAB. CODE §6361.
189. Id §§6390-6399.2.
190. Id §6385(a).
191. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE §339 (which includes in the list carbon monoxide, formalde-
hyde, nitrogen dioxide, acetaldehyde, nicotine, benzo[a]pyrene, phenols, and arsenic).
192. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§24200-24261.
193. Id §24220(b).
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which standards have been adopted. 194
The known carcinogens contained in sidestream smoke (formalde-
hyde, benzo[a]pyrene, and dimethylnitrosamine) are not among the
enumerated substances, 95 nor are they contained in the regulations
which pertain to the standards for carcinogens in the workplace.' 96
Furthermore, the Occupational Carcinogens Control Act relates to em-
ployees who are involved in the "use" of a carcinogen as part of their
employment, 197 which is defined as "any use of a carcinogen by an em-
ployer."'' 9 8 Thus, the protections afforded by the Occupational Carcin-
ogens Control Act of 1976 are inapplicable to nonsmoking employees
who are exposed to the carcinogens contained in the sidestream smoke
produced by their fellow employees. A nonsmoker might then seek
protection under statutes that generally require an employer to provide
a safe workplace.
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970199 requires
each employer to furnish each employee a place of employment that is
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees."° Pursuant to the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Act, states may enact their own plans
for safety in employment if the Secretary of Labor grants approval.20 '
The plan for California was so approved and was implemented by the
enactment of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Cal-
OSHA).
2 0 2
Cal-OSHA was enacted expressly "for the purpose of assuring safe
and healthful working conditions for all California working men and
women."20 3 Every employer is required to furnish a place of employ-
ment to employees that is safe and healthful,2" and to do everything
reasonably necessary to protect the life, safety, and health of employ-
ees.2 05 Cal-OSHA prohibits an employer from occupying a place of
employment that is not safe and healthful2 °" and from requiring or per-
mitting an employee to be in any place of employment which is not
safe and healthful.2"7 "Safe" as applied to a place of employment
194. Id §24204.
195. See id
196. See 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §5209.
197. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §24203.
198. Id §24209.5 (emphasis added).
199. 29 U.S.C. §§651-678 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
200. Id §654.
201. Id §667.
202. CAL. LAB. CODE §§6300-6708 [hereinafter referred to in text as Cal-OSHA].
203. Id §6300.
204. Id §6400.
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means "such freedom from danger to the life, safety, or health of em-
ployees as the nature of the employment reasonably permits."20 8 Cal-
OSHA confers jurisdiction upon the Division of Occupational Safety
and Health in the Department of Industrial Relations 20 9 to enforce
standards and orders promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Standards Board.
210
Regulations promulgated pursuant to Cal-OSHA are contained in
Title 8 of the California Administrative Code.21' Although Title 8 con-
tains no specific standard for sidestream tobacco smoke,21 2 specific
standards have been set for individual components of sidestream
smoke.213 Measuring the safety of a workplace based on the levels of
individual components of sidestream smoke may be inconclusive, how-
ever, because, according to the Surgeon General, the substances in cig-
arette smoke "may interact so that the combined pathological effects of
several substances may be quite different from the sum of their effects
produced in isolation. ' 214 Thus, the standards that exist for the indi-
vidual components contained in sidestream smoke may not be an effec-
tive measurement for the combined effect of the substances contained in
sidestream smoke.
The California Administrative Code also contains General Industry
Safety Orders that appear to be applicable.21 5 Certain provisions of the
General Industry Safety Orders establish minimum standards for the
prevention of "harmful exposure" of employees to dusts, fumes, mists,
vapors, and gases.21 6 A harmful exposure is defined in part as one
which, through inhalation, results in, or is likely to result in, injury,
illness, disease, impairment, or loss of function.217 The regulations pro-
vide that harmful exposures are to be prevented by engineering con-
trols if feasible and, if not feasible, by administrative controls.21 8
Although it is conceivable that an employee could seek protection
under these regulations pertaining to harmful exposure to dusts, fumes,
mists, vapors, and gases, as a matter of regular administrative practice,
complaints regarding sidestream smoke are not entertained by the
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smoker who seeks a smoke-free workplace in California.
D. Statutory Proposal
A review of pertinent California statutes has revealed that, although
some nonsmoking employees are protected by California law, many
employees are not protected."2 ' In light of the recent legislative enact-
ments that protect some employees,221 and the legislative finding that
tobacco smoke is a hazard to the health of the general public, 2 laws
should be enacted that will protect all working men and women from
the toxic and carcinogenic components of sidestream smoke at their
workplaces. Amendments to the California Indoor Clean Air Act
would accomplish this task. The Legislature could protect all non-
smoking employees by defining "public place" in the California Indoor
Clean Air Act to include indoor places of work and by directing the
Department of Health Services, in consultation with the Department of
Industrial Relations, to establish rules to "restrict or prohibit smoking
in those places of work where the proximity of workers or the inade-
quacy of ventilation causes smoke pollution detrimental to the health
or comfort of nonsmoking employees." 22'
In addition, the California Indoor Clean Air Act presently provides
that a person may apply for a writ of mandate to compel compliance by
any public entity which has violated the statute.2 2 4 Further provision is
made for the recovery of attorneys' fees and reasonable suit costs in the
event judgment is for the applicant.2 25 To ensure an equally efficient
remedy for persons in private places of employment, a provision should
be added to the California Indoor Clean Air Act which would (1) allow
an employee to seek an injunction requiring an employer to comply
with the provisions of the Act, and (2) provide for the recovery of attor-
neys' fees and reasonable suit costs. The California Indoor Clean Air
Act would thus be expanded from affording protection only in specified
public places to affording protection in private places of employment as
well. These proposed changes in the California Indoor Clean Air Act
would result in the clear statutory delineation of the rights of all non-
tions, Cal-OSHA Consultation Services, in Sacramento, California (Mar. 28, 1983). If the situa-
tion involved extenuating circumstances (definite medical complications), the agency might
investigate the complaint. (Notes on file at the Pac~fc Law Journal).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 173-219.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 173-83.
222. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25940.5.
223. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-106. This proposal is also based on the Clean Indoor Air Acts
of Minnesota and Nebraska. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§144.413-144.414; NEB. REV. STAT. §§71-5704,
71-5707.
224. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25945.
225. Id
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smoking employees and would provide for a remedy prescribed by law.
In this way, all nonsmoking workers in California would be effectively
protected from the toxins and carcinogens of sidestream smoke in the
workplace.
CONCLUSION
Recent scientific studies that reveal the risks posed to nonsmokers by
sidestream smoke have prompted legal action by nonsmokers who seek
to establish their right to a smoke-free workplace. An analysis of re-
cent cases has revealed that a hypersensitive nonsmoker, in certain cir-
cumstances, has a legal right to a smoke-free work environment.226
This right is based on a finding that hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke
renders a person physically handicapped and entitles that person to the
protection of employment antidiscrimination laws. Analogizing these
cases to California law has revealed that a hypersensitive nonsmoking
employee in California would be afforded protection under the Califor-
nia Fair Employment and Housing Act.227 The CFEHA does not ap-
ply to all employers however. Therefore, a hypersensitive nonsmoker
employed by one who is not bound by the provisions of the CFEHA is
in the same legal position in California as a nonsmoker who is not
hypersensitive. This comment has demonstrated that the plight of a
nonsmoker who is not hypersensitive is a difficult one. The nonsmoker
is afforded no rights under the United States Constitution or the Cali-
fornia Constitution. Although the nonsmoker may institute a com-
mon-law action based on a breach of the employer's duty to provide a
safe workplace, bringing a common-law action is a cumbersome and
inefficient method of dealing with the problem because each affected
nonsmoker must go into court merely to establish a right. Further-
more, the court must then fashion an appropriate remedy for each non-
smoker who seeks relief in the workplace. 228  Other states have
responded to this inefficiency by enacting statutes that expressly protect
nonsmokers in the workplace. California statutory law, however, ex-
pressly protects only nonsmokers who are employed by the state, by a
public school, or by those places of employment specified in the Cali-
fornia Indoor Clean Air Act. An examination of California statutes
that generally relate to the health of employees in the workplace has
revealed the inapplicability of those laws to the situation faced by the
nonsmoker in the workplace.
229
226. See supra text accompanying notes 38-103.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 56-103.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 187-219.
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This comment concludes that legislation is necessary to protect all
nonsmoking workers from the hazards of sidestream smoke in the
workplace.23 ° The suggested proposal is an amendment to the Califor-
nia Indoor Clean Air Act. The enactment of this proposal would
(1) expressly establish the rights of nonsmoking employees, and
(2) provide a remedy by law. As demonstrated, the specific statutory
delineation of the rights of and remedies for nonsmokers in the work-
place would provide the most effective and efficient method of provid-
ing protection to those who presently suffer from the unavoidable
consequences of breathing in a smoke-filled work environment.
Jana Therese Whitgrove
230. See supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
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